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THAT "MOST REMARKABLE WORK" -
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
When the Constitution of the United States was a century
old,1 Gladstone2 used the phrase "most remarkable work" in
paying tribute to it. Were Gladstone alive in this year of its
165th anniversary, after nearly three-quarters of a century
more in the life of our Constitution, he might well utter the
same words with yet greater awe. For, no less than astonish-
ing has been its elasticity in meeting the needs of the country
in the years of its growth. While its basic tenets remain firm,
their validity and wisdom have been demonstrated over and
over again, as have been the validity and wisdom of the Ten
Commandments.
When Gladstone sent his message, the thirteen original
states situated along a narrow strip of the eastern coast of the
continent, in which some three million people had lived in an
agricultural economy, had grown to thirty-eight states
stretching from border to border; had developed into an
industrial nation with a population of some sixty million.
That "most remarkable work" had withstood the early grow-
ing pains of the republic, and had met the changing and
expanding needs of a people so multiplied as to numbers, so
kaleidoscopically altered in economy, living geographically
in a .territory extended so many thousands of miles. It had
survived a war among the states themselves.
The sixty-five years that have passed since the centennial
have seen the population leap from sixty million to close to
one hundred and sixty million. American enterprise and
talent have brought the nation to what, to the writers of the
1 The Constitutional Convention met on May 25, 1787 and the 39 delegates
signed the completed Constitution on September 17, 1787. The anniversary of the
Constitution is commonly dated from this latter date rather than from its ratifica-
tion.
2 Letter to the committee in charge of the celebration of the centennial anni-
versary of the American Constitution, July 20, 1887.
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Constitution, would seem a miraculous age in industrial
development and expansion. The social philosophy of the
American people, as well, has matured and widened.
All this - and a Constitution written by men who lived
one hundred and sixty-five years ago in time, and much,
much longer ago in environment. What of its functioning
over the years in a series of rapidly succeeding new days in
the nation's growth?
I
Last June in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,'
the "steel case," the Supreme Court of the United States had
before it a litigation which factually symbolized the com-
plete difference in every aspect of the two eras, and the
utterly new problems this difference presents. All the ele-
ments of the situation involved were unknown and undream-
ed of when the Constitution was written: a Pation-wide
industry supplying a product used directly or indirectly by
many other nation-wide industries, which in turn supplied
products, unvisualized in 1789, that had become literally
indispensable to the way of living in 1952; a nation-wide
industry supplying especially weapons of war, unknown and
unimagined in the 18th century, and an industry-wide union.
The latter were engaged in a dispute over wages and working
conditions, which, if not resolved, would result in a work
stoppage that would halt the operation of the industry. The
President had by executive order directed the Secretary of
Commerce to seize the plants of this industry and order
their officers to operate them for the United States in ac-
cordance with his regulation and directions. The declared
basis of the seizure order was that the work stoppage would
jeopardize the national defense (we were in the second year
of war in Korea). The question for the Court was - did the
President have authority to issue that order?
3 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 817 (1952).
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The Court measured this strictly 20th century problem by
the 18th century Constitution and held that the basic princi-
ple in the Constitution of separation of powers was still
good; that this principle was still, by 20th century Ameri-
cans, deemed essential to freedom and welfare; that the
principle could not be ignored by a 20th century President.
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Black said:
The President's power . . . to issue the order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power
to see that laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions
in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he
thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the
Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall
make laws which the President is to execute.
He concluded his opinion with this: '
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power
to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do
no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and
the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a
review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order
cannot stand.
While, as Justice Jackson recognized,6
The Constitution does not disclose the measure of the actual
controls wielded by the modern presidential office. That instru-
ment must be understood as an Eighteenth-Century sketch of a
government hoped for, not as a blueprint of the Government
that is. Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that re-
served by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential
activity. Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power
that do not show on the face of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the Court held to the basic plan for our
government fashioned by the Constitution under which the
executive has no legislative power.
4 Id., 343 U.S. at 585, 587.
5 Id., 343 U.S. at 589.
6 Id., 343 U.S. at 653.
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After one hundred and sixty-five years, the Court reiter-
ated anew that the separation of powers among the depart-
ments of our government as laid down in the Constitution
was the "essence" of "free government." In the final words
of his opinion Justice Jackson said: '
The essence of our free Government is "leave to live by no
man's leave, underneath the law" - to be governed by those
impersonal forces which we call law. Our Government is fash-
ioned to fulfill this concept so far as humanly possible. The
Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legis-
lative power. The executive action we have here originates in
the individual will of the President and represents an exercise
of authority without law. No one, perhaps not even the Presi-
dent, knows the limits of the power he may seek to exert in this
instance and the parties affected cannot learn the limit of their
rights. We do not know today what powers over labor or
property would be claimed to flow from Government possession
if we should legalize it, what rights to compensation would be
claimed or recognized, or on what contingency it would end.
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have dis-
covered no technique for long preserving free government
except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law
be made by parliamentary deliberations.
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the
duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.
II
The "steel case" presented the issue dramatically, and came
at the end of a period during which there had been some
decisions which might have suggested an outlook that would
indicate a possible outcome in the "steel case" other than the
one that was reached. Nevertheless, the decision should not
have come wholly as a surprise. For through the flux and
change of the years, notwithstanding the decisions finding
constitutional authority for federal intervention in what had
previously been regarded as the sphere of the states, and for
governmental action in spheres where it had once not ventured,
the constitutional theory of the relationship between the
7 Id., 343 U.S. at 654-5.
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Federal Government and the states as conceived in the Con-
stitution had never been denied or assailed in the decisions
- nor had any of the other basic principles of the structure
of the government laid down in the Constitution.
As to the amendments to the Constitution, without ques-
tion none has altered the fundamental outlines of our gov-
ernmental system in any respect or degree.
In fact, all things considered, it is a commentary on the
wisdom of those who conceived our plan of government and
of the belief of the American people that it is good and should
not be touched, that in 165 years the Constitution has actual-
ly been amended only eleven times. The first ten amendments
may be deemed as one and contemporary with the ratifica-
tion of the original document, for they were proposed as one
and ratified by the legislatures of ten of the original states
between November 1789 and December 1791. The 11th
Amendment dealing with suits against a state and the 12th
dealing with the method of choosing the President and Vice
President came in 1798 and 1804 respectively. The 13th, 14th
and 15th Amendments were the aftermath of the Civil War,
and became part of the Constitution more than one half a
century after the 12th Amendment. In 1913 the 16th Amend-
ment was adopted making possible a federal income tax. The
same year the 17th Amendment was ratified providing for
the direct election of United States Senators. The 18th
Amendment in 1919 was the prohibition amendment and the
21st in 1933 repealed it. The 19th Amendment in 1920 gave
women the suffrage. In 1933 the 20th Amendment eliminated
"lame duck" Presidents and "lame duck" Congresses. The
last amendment, the 22nd, ratified in 1951, embodied in the
Constitution what had until 1940 been regarded as an un-
written rule, that no President should have more than two
terms.
Thus, the written Constitution, as it stands today, contains
the fundamental pattern of our form of government as it
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was set down in the original document. That pattern was
written in the fear of concentrated power; born of the knowl-
edge of the fate of the individual under a government where
power rests in one man or a group of men; and was centered
on a system of checks and balances: checks and balances
among the departments of the Federal Government, and a
withholding of power from a central government by giving it
only certain delegated authority and retaining all other in the
states and in the people.
Thomas Jefferson voiced the fear of governmental power
and particularly power in a central government when he
said: '
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this
ground - that all powers not delegated to the United States,
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states, or to the people. To take a single step
beyond ... is to take possession of a boundless field of power.
On another occasion, he said, "In questions of power let
no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down,
from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.""
III
After ensuring the diffusion of authority to the end that
Americans shall not be subject to arbitrary governmental
power, the intent and purpose of those who wrote the Con-
stitution was to embody but the broad foundation principles
of the government therein. Said Alexander Hamilton: "
Constitutions should consist only of general provisions; the
reason is that they must necessarily be permanent, and that
they cannot calculate for the possible change of things.
The very characteristics in which the brief principles of
the Constitution are stated - broad and general in terms,
8 PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 342 (1943) February 15, 1791.
9 THE KENTUCxY RESOLUTIONS 133 (Nov. 1798).
10 HAmILToN, Speech on the Senate of the United States (delivered to the Con-
vention of New York, June 28, 1788) in 2 THE WORXS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
80 (Lodge ed. 1904).
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sparing in detail - have permitted scope in development,
evolvement and adaptability.
That there would be controversy as to the meaning of con-
stitutional provisions was soon realized in McCulloch v.
Maryland." Chief Justice Marshall said, speaking of the
"acknowledged" principle that the Federal Government was
one "of enumerated powers": 12
That principle is now universally admitted. But the question
respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is per-
petually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long
as our system shall exist.
Marshall might have made the same prophesy as to virtual-
ly every other provision of the Constitution.
The "change of things" which Alexander Hamilton fore-
saw as a statesman and which Marshall foresaw as a jurist
have over the years demanded much resiliency from the
Constitution. Changing times have compelled the stretching
of constitutional provisions to include the new. In other in-
stances, "change" has compelled the Court on re-appraisal
to pull back. Perhaps that was fulfillment of Alexander
Hamilton's declaration that the Judiciary would serve as a
"safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the
society," " and Chief Justice Taft's comment that "con-
stitutions are checks upon the hasty action of the majority." "'
The "change of things" which the Constitution has had to
meet has been both physical and philosophical or sociologi-
cal. On the physical side, the change has been to make
adjustments in step with the advancements in science and
mechanics. Thus, the progress that has brought new instru-
mentalities of transportation and communication, unknown
at the time of the writing of the Constitution, and business
enterprises and methods of conducting them, then unknown,
11 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U.S. 1819).
12 Id., 4 L. Ed. at 601.
13 TnE FEanaLusT, No. 78 at 509 (Modern Library ed.).
14 A veto message, August 15, 1911, when Chief Justice Taft was President.
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has extended the coverage of the Commerce Clause"5 to them.
In 1877, Chief Justice Waite wrote: 16
The powers thus granted [to the Congress by the commerce
clause] are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce,
or the postal service known or in use when the Constitution
was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the
country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of
time and circumstances. They extend from the horse with its
rider to the stage-coach, from the sailing vessel to the steam-
boat, from the coach and the steamboat to the railroad, and
from the railroad to the telegraph, as these new agencies are
successively brought into use to meet the demands of increasing
population and wealth.
A generation later the Court said In re Debs:
Constitutional provisions do not change, but their operation
extends to new matters, as the modes of business and the
habits of life of the people vary with each succeeding genera-
tion. The law of the common carrier is the same to-day as
when transportation on land was by coach and wagon, and on
water by canal boat and sailing vessel; yet in its actual opera-
tion it touches and regulates transportation by modes then
unknown, - the railroad train and the steamship. Just so is
it with the grant to the national government of power over
interstate commerce. The Constitution has not changed. The
power is the same. But it operates to-day upon modes of inter-
state commerce unknown to the fathers, and it will operate
with equal force upon any new modes of such commerce which
the future may develop.
To the instrumentalities enumerated in those cases there
have since been added motor carriers, 18 airplanes,"9 natural
gas pipe lines,2° radio and television.2
15 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1, 24 L.
Ed. 708, 710 (1877).
-7 158 U.S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900, 909, 39 L. Ed. 1092 (1895).
18 Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1946), United
States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 62 S. Ct. 722, 86 L. Ed. 971
(1942); Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68 S. Ct. 1260, 92 L. Ed.
1633 (1948).
19 Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1946),
Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. State Airlines, 338 U.S. 572, 70 S. Ct. 379, 94 L. Ed. 353
(1950); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
68 S. Ct. 431, 92 L. Ed. 568 (1948).
20 Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 62 S. Ct.
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To see that the principle that Congress shall have power
to regulate commerce between the states would extend from
the means of conducting such commerce in 1787 to new
means as they were invented and discovered is a relatively
simple matter, clear, plausible and obviously within the anti-
cipation of the drafters of the Constitution when their own
writings are read.
IV
When the field of the physical and concrete is left and the
field of the abstract and conceptual is entered, the very
elasticity of constitutional provisions has made possible de-
cisions at times stemming from responsiveness to transitory
currents of opinion. The caution with which the Judiciary
should accede to these in reaching its determinations has been
translated into the rule that the courts are not concerned with
the wisdom of legislation but must accept that of the enact-
ing bodies unless unquestionably unreasonable.22 In reading
for us the rights and guarantees of the Constitution, any
other approach by the Court would render the essential
anchorage these constitutional provisions give, insecure in-
deed, for 23
The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a
doctrine of vague and variable quality, and, unless deducible
in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory
736, 86 L. Ed. 1037 (1942); Illinois .Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public
Service Co., 314 U.S. 498, 62 S. Ct. 384, 86 L. Ed. 371 (1942).
21 Radio Act of 1927, 44 STAT. 1162, as repealed or superseded, Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (Supp.
1952). General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 31 F.(2d) 630 (1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 464, 50 S. Ct. 389, 74 L. Ed. 969 (1930); American Bond & Mort-
gage Co. v. United States, 52 F.(2d) 318 (1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 538, 52 S.
Ct. 311, 76 L. Ed. 931 (1932); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 63 S. Ct. 997, 87 L. Ed. 1344 (1943); Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll,
184 F.(2d) 153 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929, 71 S. Ct. 490, 95 L. Ed. 670
(1951); Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 71 S. Ct. 806, 95 L.
Ed. 1062 (1951).
22 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525, 539-40, 548, 71 S. Ct. 857, 95 L.
Ed. 1137 (1951).
23 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854
(1930) ; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246, 61 S. Ct. 862, 85 L. Ed. 1305 (1941).
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provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a judicial deter-
mination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection.
The danger of easy yielding by the courts to the "public"
policy of the moment, without regard to the "constitutional"
policy, has been perceived by the Justices of the Supreme
Court down the years. As Justice Sutherland observed, "The
public policy of one generation may not, under changed
conditions, be the public policy of another." 24 Later, Justice
Douglas noted that: 25
In final analysis, the only constitutional prohibitions or
restraints which respondents have suggested for the invalida-
tion of this legislation are those notions of public policy
embedded in earlier decisions of this Court but which, as Mr.
Justice Holmes long admonished, should not be read into the
Constitution. [Citations omitted]. Since they do not find ex-
pression in the Constitution, we cannot give them continuing
vitality as standards by which the constitutionality of the
economic and social programs of the states is to be determined.
In the "steel case," Justice Douglas in substance was re-
peating this view when he said: 2
If we sanctioned the present exercise of power by the Presi-
dent, we would be expanding Article II of the Constitution and
rewriting it to suit the political conveniences of the present
emergency.
That is not to say that the "wisdom, necessity and validity"
of laws - both federal and state - are not decided in the
light of existing conditions. It could not well be otherwise.
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell 2 is illustrative.
There the constitutionality of a Minnesota mortgage mora-
torium act was in question. The Court upheld it in an opinion
by Chief Justice Hughes, in which he said in part: 2
24 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854
(1930).
25 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246-7, 61 S. Ct. 862, 85 L. Ed. 1305 (1941).
26 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 632, 72 S. Ct. 863,
96 L. Ed. 817 (1952).
27 290 U.S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 413 (1934).
28 Id., 290 U.S. at 425, 426, 442-3.
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Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not
increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions
imposed upon power granted or reserved.
While emergency does not create power, emergency may
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.
It is no answer to say that this public need was not appre-
hended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the
Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to
the vision of our time. If by the statement that what the Con-
stitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is
intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must
be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the
conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon
them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard
against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall
uttered the memorable warning - "We must never forget that
it is a constitution we are expounding" (McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 4 Wheat. 316, 407) - "a constitution intended to endure
for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs." Id., p. 415.
Similarly, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,29 where the
validity of a local building zone ordinance was before the
Court, the opinion cited that building zone laws were "of
modern origin," having sprung in the preceding twenty-five
years0 of the transition of urban life from the "comparatively
simple" to the more complicated in communities with in-
creased and concentrated population and the attending prob-
lems. The constitutionality of government regulation must
then be judged in the setting of conditions. Said the Court in
that case: 31
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as
applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are
now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century
ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex
conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which
justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of auto-
mobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been con-
29 272 U.S. 365,47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926).
30 The Court was writing in 1926.
31 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71'L. Ed. 303
(1926).
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demned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there
is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional
guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions
which are constantly coming within the field of their operation.
In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be other-
wise..
The Court added the admonition: 32
But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to
the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles,
statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to the
new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Con-
stitution, of course, must fall.
The last, as we have seen and shall see further, is the
constitutional principle to which the Court adheres today.
It is the "elasticity" in application that has provoked sharp
dispute concerning some decisions among the Justices, and
in some cases beyond the walls of the Supreme Court building.
"Interpreting" and "applying" the clauses of the Constitu-
tion over the years in the "conditions" and "outlook" that
those passing years have produced, the Court has found
power in the Constitution, on the one hand, for the Federal
Government in spheres that in the circumstances and views
of an earlier day might well have been deemed properly be-
longing to the states. On the other hand, the Court similarly
has found constitutional authority for state governments
that once might have been regarded as outside the perimeter
of any governmental authority.
The interpretation of specific powers in the Constitution
to permit their utilization for policing the life of a nation
which was growing rapidly more complex and more far flung
commenced before the Constitution had reached its centen-
nial.33 As far as the Federal Government is concerned, the
Commerce Clause especially has been the touchstone. In it
32 Ibid.
33 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 5 S. Ct. 826, 828-9, 29
L. Ed. 158 (1885).
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has been found authority for the Federal Government to
prohibit interstate transporation of diseased livestock, 4 of
lottery tickets, 35 of articles condemned under the Pure Food
and Drugs Act36 and of intoxicating liquors." The Lindbergh
kidnapping act 3 likewise has its authority in the Commerce
Clause.39
Price fixing by Congress of products and services which
transcend state lines has been upheld. The Packers and
Stockyards Act of 1921 permitting the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to determine the charges to be made b brokers selling
livestock in interstate commerce has been held a valid exer-
cise of the commerce power.4" So also, the fixing of the mini-
mum price of milk; 1 the price fixing provisions of the Bitum-
inous Coal Act of 1937; 2 the Grain Futures Act; "1 the
tobacco marketing quotas of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938; "' the Tobacco Inspection Act; '5 and the Sugar Act
of 1948,46 which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to
make allotments of sugar quotas which may be marketed in
the United States, all have rested on the power of Congress
34 Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108 (1902).
35 Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492
(1903).
30 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364, 55 L. Ed. 364
(1911).
37 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180,
61 L. Ed. 326 (1917).
38 48 STAT. 781 (1934), 18 U.S.C. §§ 408a-408c (1946).
30 Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S. Ct. 395, 80 L. Ed. 522 (1936).
40 Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 50 S. Ct. 220, 75 L.
Ed. 524 (1930); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735
(1922).
41 United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed.
1446 (1939).
42 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S. Ct. 907, 84 L. Ed.
1263 (1940).
43 Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed. 839
(1923).
44 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939).
45 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379, 83 L. Ed. 441 (1939).
46 Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 70 S. Ct.
403, 94 L. Ed. 381 (1950).
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to regulate interstate commerce. This clause, too, has been
the basis of the national labor laws."
When the purpose of federal legislation had been candidly
regulatory, not of interstate commerce, but of the activity
engaged in interstate, it was inevitable that the argument
would be made that a wholly intrastate activity affected the
interstate commerce and should be included in the regulatory
measure. This argument has frequently been successful.
Thus, a rate clerk employed by an interstate motor transpor-
tation company,48 and maintenance employees of a building
whose tenants engaged principally in the production of goods
for interstate commerce 4' have been held to be engaged in in-
terstate commerce. Similarly, the Agriculture Marketing
Agreement Act, regulating the price of milk moving in inter-
state commerce, was held to extend to the regulation of the
price of intrastate milk which competed with interstate
milk.5"
As a corollary, state laws or local ordinances governing
intrastate transactions have at times been held invalid as a
burden on interstate commerce. 5
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, adopted in 1890, also under
the Commerce Clause, has been held, in recent years, to apply
47 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941);
National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 59 S. Ct. 668, 83 L. Ed.
1014 (1939); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937).
48 Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S. Ct. 1216,
86 L. Ed. 1682 (1942).
49 A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1173, 86 L. Ed. 1620
(1942).
50 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 62 S. Ct. 523, 86 L. Ed.
726 (1942).
51 Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 72 S. Ct. 421, 96
L. Ed. 364 (1952), holding a state tax in Mississippi on the solicitation of business
for a laundry licensed in Tennessee invalid; Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S.
349, 71 S. Ct. 295, 95 L. Ed. 329 (1951), holding a city ordinance, which forbade
the sale of milk as pasteurized unless it was pasteurized within five miles of the city,
to be discriminatory against interstate commerce. The Court, as a general proposi-
tion, has held, nevertheless, that same business was subject to regulation by the
Federal Government in its interstate aspects and the state governments in its intra-
state aspects. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.
Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944), see note 52 infra.
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to businesses previously held not to be interstate commerce,
such as the insurance business.52
While the Commerce Clause has been the basis for inter-
state regulation in the case of federal legislation, the states,
on the other hand, have utilized the "police power" to counter
the challenge to their legislation under the due process pro-
vision of the Constitution. The New York emergency housing
laws of 1920 were sustained as a permissible exercise of the
State's police power and, accordingly, not invalid as violating
due process.53 Regulation by a state of the milk industry
therein,54 and the myriad state and local laws and ordinances
governing the conduct of business, the professions, labor
relations and the use of property have also been sustained
on that theory.55
52 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct.
1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944) ; cf. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (U.S.
1869) ; Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 15 S. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297 (1895).
53 Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 41-S. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed.
877 (1921); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 42 S. Ct -289, 66 L. Ed. 595
(1922).
54 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
55 Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570, 54 S. Ct. 277, 78 L. Ed. 505
(1934) (regulating size and weight of bread); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292,
44 S. Ct. 325, 68 L. Ed. 690 (1924) (forbidding night work by women); Bratton
v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110, 43 S. Ct. 43, 67 L. Ed. 157 (1922) (regulating real estate
brokers); McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107, 40 S. Ct. 306, 64 L. Ed. 481 (1920)
(prohibiting solicitation of claims by one not an attorney); St. Louis Poster Ad-
vertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 39 S. Ct. 274, 63 L. Ed. 599 (1919) (regu-
lating billboards); N.Y. Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed.
667 (1917) (establishing workmen's compensation system); Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539, 37 S. Ct. 217, 61 L. Ed. 480 (1917) (regulating stock sales);
Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340, 36 S. Ct. 561, 60 L. Ed. 1034 (1916) (regulating
empl6yment agencies); Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510, 36 S. Ct.
440, 60 L. Ed. 771 (1916) (regulating size and character of packages in which goods
are sold); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 34 S. Ct. 60, 58 L.
Ed. 245 (1913) (prohibiting child labor); Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572, 33 S.
Ct. 610, 57 L. Ed. 971 (1913) (requiring tuberculin test for fluid milk); Shallen-
berger v. First State Bank of Holstein, 219 U.S. 114, 31 S. Ct. 189, 55 L. Ed. 117
(1911) (prohibiting any but corporations to engage in banking business) ; Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (1908) (regulating hours of labor
by women); Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 22 S. Ct. 425, 46 L. Ed. 623 (1902)
(prohibiting sales of stock or grain on margin); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183,
20 S. Ct. 633, 44 L. Ed. 725 (1900) (regulating sale of cigarettes) ; Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366, 18 S. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780 (1898) (prescribing hours of labor) ; Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S. Ct. 231, 32 L. Ed. 623 (1889) (regulating prac-
tice of medicine); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 8 S. Ct. 992, 32 L. Ed.
253 (1888) (prohibiting manufacture or sale of oleomargarine).
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V
The interpretation of the Bill of Rights has provided over
the years perhaps the greatest fluctuation in accordance with
the "conditions" and "outlook" of the times. This has been
particularly so in the quarter century since World War I. In
the years immediately following that conflict, the Court
balanced the case for the public as against the rights of the
individual under the Bill of Rights. 6 Later came the period
when the tendency was to give the Bill of Rights the widest
construction for the protection of the individual as to all
utterances."
In the last two years the Court has reverted to a balancing
of the freedom of expression by the individual under the Bill
of Rights with the interests of the community as a whole."
VI
In some instances broad construction of constitutional
provisions has brought decisions which, if the line were pur-
sued, would come close to weakening the structure of our
governmental position as designed in the Constitution - a
56 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925); United
States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 414,
41 S. Ct. 352, 65 L. Ed. 704 (1921); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct.
247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919).
57 Conspicuous decisions in this line of cases are: Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.
Ct. 1148, 92 L. Ed. 1574 (1948) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89
L. Ed. 430 (1945) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192
(1941) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940) ;
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066 (1940) ; Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155 (1939); Hague v. C. I. 0., 307
U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.
Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L.
Ed. 1066 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278
(1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117 (1931).
58 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. Ed. 295
(1952) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S. Ct. 857, 95 L. Ed. 1137 (1951) ;
American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S. Ct. 629, 94 L.
Ed. 839 (1950) ; see also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S. Ct. 920, 95 L. Ed.
1233 (1951) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S. Ct. 448, 93 L. Ed. 513 (1949);
cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 609 (1952).
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union of states with a central government of specifically dele-
gated powers only. These decisions have been in the field of
taxation particularly." Traditionally, the instrumentalities
of state governments had been held immune from taxation
by the Federal Government,6" as the instrumentalities of the
Federal Government are immune from taxation by the
states.6 The first breach came with Helvering v. Gerhardt,"2
holding that the salaries of state employees were subject to
taxation by the Federal Government.63 In 1946 came the
decision, New York v. United States,64 which would pose a
great threat to the financial and, therefore, governmental
strength of the states if there were any further decisions along
the same line. The Court there held that the sale by the State
of New York of waters from the mineral springs located at
Saratoga Springs, owned and operated by the State, was
subject to federal tax. Plainly, to leave open to federal tax
the sources of state revenue would make it impossible for
the states to provide necessary facilities for the people. The
strong dissent of Justice Douglas, in which Justice Black
concurred, showed an appreciation of this fact and encour-
agement that there would be vigorous opposition in the Court
to any further similar encroachments. That dissent empha-
sized the sovereignty of the states in our scheme of govern-
ment and immunity from federal taxation as an essential
59 In the same vein, however, has been the construction of the 14th Amendment
as incorporating the Bill of Rights and making them applicable to the states.
60 Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (U.S. 1871); United States v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 17 Wall. 322, 21 L. Ed. 597 (U.S. 1873); Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759 (1895); Ambrosini v.
United States, 187 U.S. 1, 23 S. Ct. 1, 47 L. Ed. 49 (1902); South Carolina v. Uni-
ted States, 199 U.S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110, 50 L. Ed. 261 (1905); Brush v. Comm'n, 300
U.S. 352, 57 S. Ct. 495, 81 L. Ed. 691 (1937).
61 justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572, 592 n. 2, 66 S. Ct. 310, 90 L. Ed. 326 (1946).
62 304 U.S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427 (1938).
63 The following year (1939) the Court held, as it was logically bound to, that
the salaries of federal employees were taxable by the states. Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595, 83 L. Ed. 927 (1939).
64 326 U.S. 572, 66 S. Ct. 310, 90 L. Ed. 326 (1946).
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concomitant of that sovereignty. Justice Douglas quoted
from Woodrow Wilson as follows: 65
... "the States of course possess every power that government
has ever anywhere exercised, except only those powers which
their own constitutions or the Constitution of the United
States explicitly or by plain inference withhold. They are the
ordinary governments of the country; the federal government
is its instrument only for particular purposes."
The opinion quoted from an early decision of the Court66
as follows: 67
"The right of the States to administer their own affairs
through their legislative, executive, and judicial departments,
in their own manner through their own agencies, is conceded
by the uniform decisions of this court and by the practice of
the Federal government from its organization. This carries
with it an exemption of those agencies and instruments, from
the taxing power of the Federal government. If they may be
taxed lightly, they may be taxed heavily; if justly, oppres-
sively. Their operation may be impeded and may be destroyed,
if any interference is permitted."
Justice Douglas then went on to caution: 68
A tax is a powerful, regulatory instrument. Local govern-
ment in this free land does not exist for itself. . . . Local
government exists to provide for the welfare of its people.... If
the federal government can place the local governments on its
tax collector's list, their capacity to serve the needs of their
citizens is at once hampered or curtailed. The field of federal
excise taxation alone is practically without limits. Many state
activities are in marginal enterprises where private capital
refuses to venture. Add to the cost of these projects a federal
tax and the social program may be destroyed before it can be
launched. In any case, the repercussions of such a fundamental
change on the credit of the States and on their programs to
take care of the needy and to build for the future would be
considerable .... The power to tax lightly is the power to tax
severly. The power to tax is indeed one of the most effective
forms of regulation. And no more powerful instrument for
centralization of government could be devised.
65 Id., 326 U.S. at 592.
66 United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 17 Wall. 322, 21 L. Ed. 597, 599
(U.S. 1873).
67 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 593, 66 S. Ct. 310, 90 L. Ed. 326
(1946).
68 Id., 326 U.S. at 593-5.
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The Constitution was designed to keep the balance between
the States and the Nation outside the field of legislative con-
troversy.
The immunity of the States from federal taxation is no less
clear because it is implied. The States on entering the Union
surrendered some of their sovereignty. It was further curtailed
as various Amendments were adopted. But the Tenth Amend-
ment provides that "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The
Constitution is a compact between sovereigns.... If the power
of the federal government to tax the States is conceded, the
reserved power of the States guaranteed by the Tenth Amend-
ment does not give them the independence which they have
always been assumed to have. They are relegated to a more
servile status. They become subject to interference and control
both in the functions which they exercise and the methods
which they employ. They must pay the federal government for
the privilege of exercising the powers of sovereignty guaranteed
them by the Constitution....
Conclusion
In reflective birthday spirit, this article on the 165th anni-
versary of the Constitution has surveyed - most sketchily
to be sure - the shape and outlines of its growth. We have
seen the ways in which the framework has been filled in by
construction and interpretation. We have also seen that no
pressure of changing times or crucial events has persuaded
the Court that the essential framework was wrong or lacking
in any respect. We have seen its elasticity meeting changing
times and changing modes. With it all, its basic structure has
maintained its firmness.
Events have shown need for flexibility and continuity when
applied to constitutional documents, so that the law may be
able to adjust itself to the exigencies arising out of the ever
changing circumstances and situations in life: "
In law particularly, there must be a balance between stabil-
ity and change, between the stability required by the economic
69 Pound, The Constitution: Its Development, Adaptability, and Future, 23
A.B.A.J. 739, 742 (1937).
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order and the change involved in the life which law is to
govern. Law must be firm enough to assure stability and flex-
ible enough to adapt itself to change.
Justice McReynolds' wail that, "The Constitution is
gone," 70 was a deepseated mistake. Those who regard a
static constitution as a necessity lack faith in the enduring
power of a flexible document; an "immovable body" may
well prove less secure than they believe. "Indeed the ever-
changing Tiber has outlasted all the buildings that once
stood motionless along its banks." "'
Nathaniel L. Goldstein*
70 The essence of this statement was made from the bench by Justice Mc-
Reynolds at the time he delivered the dissenting opinion in the Gold Clause cases.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1935, p. 1, col. 7; Id. at p. 16, col. 5. See also Jaffe, The
Supreme Court Today, 174 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 76 (Dec. 1944).
71 Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COL. L. REv. 381, 403 (1941).
Cf. Lord Macmillan's reference to the statement that, "'Respect for the law . . I
depends in the long run on the power to change it.'" MACMILLAN, Law and Politics
in LAW AND OTHER THINGS 13 (1937).
* Attorney General of the State of New York. B.C.S., 1915, New York Univer-
sity; C.P.A., 1919; LL.B., 1918, New York Law School; LL.D., 1949, Syracuse
University (Honorary). Member of the Advisory Boards of New York University
and University of Buffalo Graduate Schools of Government. Member of the New
York Bar and the American Bar Association. Contributor to numerous legal period-
icals.
